Eating Grass: An Insider’s Account of the Pakistani
Nuclear Program
A few English speakers will definitely be surprised
to know that the first part of the title of Feroz Hassan Khan’s book “Eating
Grass: The Making of the Pakistani bomb” has no relation to the phrase ‘smoking
grass.’ ‘Eating grass’ is a literal
translation of an Urdu saying; an idiomatic translation of that phrase will be
‘Going hungry.’ The ‘Eating grass’
phrase used in this context comes from a 1965 statement made by the then
Pakistani Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto, responding to news of India’s plans
to make an atomic bomb said if India made a bomb, the Pakistanis would go
through any hardship to attain matching nuclear capability.
What makes Brigadier (Retired) Feroz Hassan Khan
qualified to write a book on Pakistan’s nuclear program, taking the reader
through its various historical phases?
First, Feroz Khan is a scholar and a defense analyst, currently teaching
at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, and second, more
importantly, serving in the Strategic Plans Division, Joint Services
Headquarters of the army, Feroz Khan was involved with Pakistan Army’s
supervision of the nuclear program till his retirement in 2003. ‘Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani
bomb’ is very much an insider’s account of the Pakistani nuclear program.
Feroz Hassan Khan’s book, published by the Stanford
University Press, is being promoted in Pakistan and the US through book review
meetings. On Sunday, February 10, over
150 people attended a discussion on ‘Eating Grass’ held at Fremont Marriott.
The program was arranged by Sabahat Rafiq, a Democratic Party delegate for the
2012 Democratic Convention, and Naveed Sherwani, a Silicon Valley entrepreneur.
The
program began with an introduction of the book and the writer by Sabahat Rafiq. Rafiq said, “Interwoven in this story
[Brigadier Feroz Khan’s account of the making of the bomb] are some fundamental
strategic policies of the First World narrative for non-proliferation wherein
the former seeks to badger the later into non-proliferation and yet fails to
provide guarantee for their security and territorial integrity. To add insult
to injury there is an ever pervasive suggestion of First World’s hegemony over
common sense, innovation, and sensible responsibility…and sometimes outright
contempt.
“The
former also continues to swap alliances and partnerships based on their own
shifting strategic interests, to maintain global hegemony without due regard to
the security interest of a former ally.”
Rafiq narrated to the audience Pakistan’s various
phases of alliance [with the US] Feroz Khan had identified in his book. These phases were: most allied of the allies
in the 60s, the most sanctioned ally in the 90s, and the most bullied ally in
the 2000s.
Sabahat Rafiq briefly described the five stages —delineated
in the book—Pakistani nuclear program passed through. The five phases being: i) Reluctant Phase,
from 60s to 1971; ii) Secret Nuclear R&D Program phase, a corollary of the
‘Never Again’ conviction [after Pakistan’s humiliating defeat by the Indian
Army in 1971], iii) the 80s and 90s phase, pertaining to the weaponization of
the nuclear capability, and demonstration of that strength, iv) Post-98 era wherein Pakistan’s nascent
nuclear program was to be tuned into an operation deterrent , and v) Present
Stage (Post 911)—when Pakistan’s nuclear capability is watched with interest,
by the world.
In
his speech Feroz Hassan Khan said it took him more than a decade to write the
book. He said shortly after joining the Naval Postgraduate School in 2003,
the news of AQ Khan’s revealed network stunned Pakistan. A ship named BBC China was caught in the
Mediterranean-- allegedly, the German ship bound for Libya from Dubai was carrying
centrifuge parts made in Malaysia, to AQ Khan’s design.
Feroz
Khan said a year after that incident he was interviewing Musharraf in
Pakistan. Khan asked Musharraf what was
the most difficult of the five crises Musharraf went through during his tenure
as the head of the army—the five crises being the Kargil war, the 1998 coup,
911, 2002 standoff with India, and the AQ Khan scandal. Musharraf told
Khan it was the AQ Khan ordeal. Khan was curious to know why the AQ Khan
case was so debilitating for Musharraf.
According to Feroz Khan, Musharraf said, “In all previous crises, as a
military man, my gut would tell me what to do.” But this was one crisis, whose extent he
(Musharraf) did not know, whose implication he did not understand…this was like
a train hitting him straight. Feroz Khan
told Musharraf of his apprehension that from then on (after the revelation of
AQ Khan’s network selling nuclear technology to all willing to pay) Pakistan’s
nuclear program would be reviewed through only one lens. Musharraf asked Khan what could be done about
that [so that Pakistan’s nuclear program would not be reviewed so unfavorably
by the international community]. Feroz
Khan suggested to Musharraf the best way was to get to the world a holistic
picture of the program (through a book).
Musharraf agreed with Khan. A year later Khan and Peter Lavoy (presently
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security
Affairs)—both Khan and Lavoy were going to write the book together—presented a
comprehensive outline of how they intended to proceed, and requested access to
Pakistani nuclear professionals and to declassified documents. According to Khan, after a very careful
scrutiny Khan and Lavoy were allowed to interview retired scientists, military and
civilian officials, and academics. After
Lavoy left the book writing project in 2007 to accept a government job, Khan
took it upon himself to complete the work.
Feroz
Khan said critics of his book accuse him of playing down the AQ Khan
scandal. He said his book does not go too much into the detail of the
scandal as three to four books on that subject already exist.
Feroz
Khan considers his book “a human story, a book about a country’s life history. It is just not about proliferation (alone).” He described to the audience the “seven
factors” he had weaved in the book: 1) the ‘strategic culture’, Pakistan’s historical
experience and how it feels about its existence in the world, ii) domestic
politics, iii) regional security crises and wars, iv) cold war, the alliance
politics, the disillusionment with the alliance, while cleverly benefiting from
the alliance politics, v) the international non-proliferation regime and the
challenges, a section in the book is called ‘the Toms and Jerrys of the World’,
vi) idiosyncrasies of the personalities, and vii) the technical determinism.
Feroz
Khan’s speech was followed by a Q&A session moderated by Sabahat Rafiq.
Dr.
Syed Rifaat Hussain, a professor of security studies from Pakistan, currently
visiting the Stanford University was also invited to give his views on the book
and on Pakistan’s nuclear program.
Listen
to the audio of the program here:
This report is also here:
http://pakistanlink.org/Community/2013/Feb13/22/01.HTM
An Urdu version of this report is here:
http://cemendtaur-ki-urdu-dunya.blogspot.com/2013/02/blog-post_13.html
